Do Reconciliations Of Segment Earnings Affect Stock Prices? by Hollie, Dana & Yu, Shaokun Carol
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2012 Volume 28, Number 5 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  1085 
Do Reconciliations Of Segment  
Earnings Affect Stock Prices? 
Dana Hollie, Louisiana State University, USA 
Shaokun Carol Yu, Northern Illinois University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While SFAS No. 131 is intended to increase the transparency of financial reporting using a 
“management approach,” it may reduce shareholders’ ability to interpret segment disclosures 
relative to the ‘industry approach’ employed under SFAS No.14. This study investigates whether 
segment reconciliation differences affect stock prices and whether abnormal returns can be 
earned using information about two components of earnings: aggregated segment earnings and 
segment earnings reconciliations. We compute reconciliations as the difference between firm-level 
consolidated earnings and aggregated segment-level earnings. Firms that report negative SERs 
have greater sales and profitability, greater return on equity, as well as more operating cash flows 
and firm growth. This suggests that firms that report aggregated segment earnings greater than 
firm-level consolidated earnings may be better off financially. Our findings show that mispricing 
does occur when firms report positive SERs by the market, underestimating the segment earnings 
reconciliation component of earnings persistence. Investors can also earn positive abnormal 
returns when investors take a long (short) position with the portfolio with the highest (lowest) 
absolute SERs. On the contrary, we find investors earn negative abnormal returns when firms 
report negative SERs. Collectively, this study provides evidence that mispricing occurs and that 
investors over/underestimate the importance and/or persistence of segment earnings 
reconciliations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study investigates whether the market accurately incorporates the pricing effects of the 
persistence of segment-related components of earnings: aggregated segment earnings and firm-to-
segment reconcilable differences (SER). This study adds to the extant literature on the pricing of 
different components of earnings and the quality of financial reporting under the SFAS No. 131 segment-reporting 
regime. The results indicate that mispricing does occur, when firms report positive SERs, by the market 
underestimating SER persistence. For these same firms, investors can also earn positive abnormal returns. On the 
contrary, we find investors earn negative abnormal returns when firms report negative SERs. Collectively, this study 
provides evidence that mispricing occurs and that investors over/underestimate the importance of SERs. 
 
In 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) introduced SFAS No. 131, Disclosures about 
Segments on Enterprise and Related Information (hereafter referred to as SFAS No. 131). This standard was 
developed primarily to enable external users to view companies “through the eyes of management” by requiring 
firms to report segment financial information consistent with how the business is managed internally (a.k.a. the 
management approach). Therefore, the management approach may lead to reported segment-level earnings measures 
that differ from GAAP earnings measures. As a result, segment-level data in financial reports may not necessarily 
reconcile or exactly equate to the consolidated financial information provided at the firm level. In other words, the 
whole (firm-level) may not equal the sum of its parts (segment-level). We refer to the “sum of its parts” as the total 
aggregated segment-level earnings. Accordingly, we compute firm-segment differences as the difference between 
firm-level consolidated earnings and aggregated segment-level earnings from all identifiable segments. As a result, 
we decompose earnings into the following two components: aggregated segment earnings and firm-segment 
T 
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reconcilable differences. Under the management approach, these SERs may arise from (1) differences in measuring 
performance management discretion at the segment-level versus the “traditional” GAAP operating earnings at the 
firm level, (2) unreportable segments, (3) unallocated costs and (4) unallocated revenue or gains. An illustration of 
the derivation of SERs is provided as Figure 1. SERs due to differences between management approach earnings 
measurements (i.e., internal accounting) and GAAP earnings measurements should provide additional information to 
investors beyond firm-level earnings, which increases information transparency and improves market valuation. 
SERs due to intentionally unreported segments and unallocated costs/revenues should increase information 
transparency and reduce market valuation. 
 
The standard setters’ objectives were to increase comparability and transparency of the financial statements 
among firms. Many proponents of the standard, particularly analysts, anticipated that the management approach 
would increase transparency between internal and external observers, by better aligning internal and external 
financial reporting. This argument is consistent with agency cost theory, which posits that disclosures may be 
deficient in consequence to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Berger and Hann 2007). The requirements of SFAS No. 131 anticipate that managers will disclose information that 
might not otherwise be disclosed due to agency problems. 
 
While the ‘management approach’ is intended to increase transparency, it potentially reduces the ability of 
shareholders and other users to interpret the disclosures. Opponents of the standard, primarily managers of the firms, 
have argued that the management approach is an “unstandard standard” because of the potential lack of consistency, 
comparability and reliability of segment-level information within and across firms (Reason, 2001). This argument is 
consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis, in which, disclosures make public proprietary information and 
proprietary costs hinder disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Hayes and Lundholm 1996). Prior research has shown that 
SFAS No. 131 imposes proprietary costs by requiring firms to disclose proprietary information (e.g., Botosan and 
Stanford, 2005). To mitigate increased proprietary costs, managers may utilize the ‘unstandard standard’ to protect 
the firm from this competitive disadvantage. 
 
James J. Leisenring, a former member of the FASB, dissented from SFAS No. 131, as it relates to the 
measurement of reported segment performance. Although Leisenring supported the management approach for 
identifying reportable operating segments, he claimed that the ambiguity in outlining the proper measurement of 
segment earnings might lead to decreased comparability across firms. Several critics share this opinion. In fact, 
some refer to the ambiguity inherent in the standard, with respect to the identification of reportable segments and the 
appropriate measures of profitability to be presented, leading others to question whether the objectives of the 
standard could be reached (Reason, 2001). 
 
Consequently, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to raise concerns about the 
implementation of the management approach as it continues to encounter cases of inappropriate applications of the 
standard (e.g.: SEC v. Richard Causey, 2004; Bayless, 2001; Turner, 1999). The SEC has expressed its intent to 
make segment disclosure requirements a central focus of SEC staff reviews. The SEC’s concerns regarding the 
current segment reporting practices suggest that the standard may not be as effective in reaching its proposed 
objectives as initially anticipated.  
 
This study intends to shed additional light on this issue by examining segment-to-firm-level earnings 
reconciliations, since these reconciliations represent the aggregated segment performance, as indicated by Berger 
and Hann (2007).
1
 As presented in Appendix A, Caterpillar, Inc. explicitly states, in its 1998 10-K, that its segment 
reporting under the management approach has limited usefulness to external readers of its financial statements. It 
discloses traditional GAAP-based financial results for all business lines in their MD&A. It does not provide details 
of the reconciliation between its firm-level and segment level measurements as required under SFAS No. 131. 
                                                 
1
 While segment reporting using the management approach is in accordance with GAAP, how a company chooses to report 
revenue, earnings, expenses and other financial data at the segment level may differ from the derivation of such components 
under GAAP. For example, a firm may choose to recognize sales at the time a sales agreement is made for segment reporting 
while GAAP, at the consolidated reporting level, does not allow this. This study’s reference to GAAP or non-GAAP is solely 
based on the derivation of earnings at the segment level. 
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Another example (not presented) is the use of the Economic Value Added (EVA) method by Briggs & Stratton to 
evaluate divisional performance and to assist in internal decision making (i.e., management approach). However, the 
firm reports its segment information using GAAP-based measurements rather than its EVA measurements of 
performance. There are many examples of these inconsistencies and variations in firms’ segment reporting under the 
SFAS No. 131 segment-reporting regime. In contrast, Cooper Rubber & Tire Co. reports segment financial 
information that is consistent with both GAAP and how they manage the business internally. We primarily focus on 
examining SERs and mispricing under the current SFAS 131 segment-reporting regime since this is the regime that 
firms, investors, analysts and regulators are operating under at this time. However, we do provide a brief analysis 
and discussion, in the additional analysis section, on the pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 segment-reporting regimes.  
 
This study adds to the extant literature by determining whether the market correctly incorporates the pricing 
effects of the persistence of aggregated segment earnings and SERs under SFAS No. 131. If the market fails to 
understand the time-series properties of aggregated segment earnings or SERs, then stock prices will systematically 
understate/overstate the value of the firm in a predictable manner. That is, if the market correctly perceives the 
persistence of SERs, then stock prices will move in a predictable manner in the subsequent year. Therefore, a trading 
strategy based on the SER component of earnings would prove beneficial.  
 
Since SERs can be a positive or negative segment on the financial statement, it seems only natural to 
investigate them individually. Therefore, we investigate both positive and negative SERs throughout this paper. Our 
findings indicate that the market underestimates the SER component of earnings for firms that report positive SERs, 
giving rise to a positive relation between positive SERs and abnormal stock returns. The results suggest that stock 
prices do not accurately reflect the time-series properties of positive SERs. They also indicate that it is possible to 
make positive abnormal profits by following a trading strategy focused on positive SERs. In contrast, we find that 
the market incorporates aggregated segment earnings and SER components of earnings into stock prices 
appropriately when the firm reports negative SERs. On the contrary, the same trading strategy results in negative 
abnormal returns for firms that report negative SERs. Overall, our results suggest that market participants cannot 
adequately interpret the firm-to-segment reconciliations resulting from ‘management approach’ accounting 
information, thereby causing them to underestimate the significance of these reconciliations when firms report 
positive SERs. If financial reporting, via segment disclosure, becomes more transparent as predicted by the agency 
cost hypothesis, it is less likely that market mispricing would occur. However, if financial reporting becomes less 
transparent as predicted by the proprietary hypothesis, it is more likely that market mispricing would occur. Our 
empirical findings support the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
 
As with any study in this area, conclusions cannot be made without investigating whether apparent 
abnormal returns are the result of the incorrect measurement or the control for underlying risk factors. We follow the 
tests in Thomas (2000) to help disentangle these two competing hypotheses. We estimate the relation between long-
term stock returns and SERs. If SERs were a proxy for risk, then abnormal returns would persist beyond the 
subsequent year. A permanent shift in risk will be associated with higher returns in subsequent years.  If the market 
does not fully understand the persistence of SERs, then abnormal returns should exist only in the immediate 
subsequent year and should not continue. It is less likely that mispricing could occur for several subsequent years, 
because the market will correct for its (incorrect) prior belief when earnings are realized above or below 
expectations in the subsequent year (Thomas, 2000). The results in this study show no relation between long-term 
stock returns and current SERs. Thus, the market appears to correct fully for its mispricing in the subsequent year so 
that abnormal returns do not persist for more than one year.  
 
Additional analysis shows that mispricing does not occur, and investors did not earn abnormal returns 
under the SFAS No. 14 segment-reporting regime before SFAS No. 131 became effective. The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related literature and research design; Section 3 presents the 
sample selection criteria and descriptive statistics; Section 4 discusses our empirical findings and Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
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RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Related Literature 
 
In the case of mandated segment disclosure requirements, the leeway in segment reporting standards 
provides managers with a means to strategically disclose segment information (Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996; 
Botosan and Harris, 2000). Nagarajan and Sridhar (1996) generated an analytical model indicating that similar 
mandates may induce firms to (1) reduce the value relevance of their disclosures and (2) fail to disclose some value-
relevant information. Therefore, mandating segment disclosures could reduce the relevance of segment information, 
which could lessen a firm’s transparency and actually impede the proposed benefits of SFAS No. 131. 
 
The argument regarding the costs and benefits of SFAS No. 131 is still an ongoing issue in the academic 
literature. For example, prior research shows an increase in the number of reported segments post-SFAS No. 131 
(e.g., Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Street, et al., 2000; Ettredge, et al., 2000), and mixed evidence on the 
incremental information provided with segment disclosure under the SFAS No. 131 segment-reporting regime (e.g., 
Venkataraman, 2001; Berger and Hann, 2003; Botosan and Harris, 2005). While prior research on the effects of 
SFAS No.14 has generally found that segment reporting provides an incremental benefit over firm-level earnings for 
the prediction of future earnings (e.g., Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Chen and Zhang, 2003), little evidence exists on 
how segment disclosure, beyond firm-level data, affects market efficiency.  
 
For example, Ettredge et al. (2006) assess whether SFAS No. 131 improved disclosure about the diversity 
of multiple segment firms’ operations. They employ a different metric to assess the effect of SFAS No. 131 on 
disclosures of information about the diversity of operating income across segments using continuous multiple-
segment reporters. Their scenario assumes managers did not use the flexibility inherent in the SFAS No. 131 
management approach to transfer revenues and costs among segments so as to conceal differences in segment 
profitability. They find a post-SFAS No. 131 increase in cross-segment variability of segment profits, an increase in 
the association between reported and inherent cross-segment variability and an increase in association between 
reported variability and capital market incentives to disclose. They interpret their findings as evidence that SFAS 
No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profitability disclosures, and, as indicated, SFAS No. 131 allowed 
firms depending more on external financing to disclose more about differences in segment profitability. Our study 
differs from Ettredge et al. (2006) in that we examine the extent to which the variability in segment earnings (i.e., 
profit) measurement differs from segment-reporting regimes, as well as whether investors can adequately interpret 
the information in these segment earnings and their corresponding reconciliations.  
 
If there is more flexibility inherent in SFAS No. 131, which allows the reporting of segment earnings 
measurements to be inconsistent with GAAP earnings measurements, we would expect SERs to be more significant 
in the post-SFAS No. 131 period. However, we do acknowledge that larger SERs do not necessarily equate to a 
change in a firm’s overall transparency to investors. That said, a decrease in the absolute value of the SERs would 
indicate that aggregated segment earnings are more closely aligned with reported firm earnings post-SFAS No. 131. 
 
Thomas (2000) and Hope et al. (2008) investigate the effects of SFAS No. 131 on the market's valuation of 
foreign earnings. Thomas (2000) finds that the market understates foreign earnings' persistence, which is consistent 
with market mispricing. Hope et al. (2008) find that investors' mispricing of foreign earnings lessens (and in fact 
disappears) subsequent to the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Our study differs from Thomas (2000) and Hope et al. 
(2008), in that they focus on foreign earnings, whereas we investigate the effects of SFAS No. 131 on the market’s 
valuation of total aggregated segment earnings (which is incrementally important to firm valuation – Chen and 
Zhang, 2003) and the corresponding reconciliation of aggregated segment-to-firm-level earnings (i.e., SERs). Since 
the earnings measurements used for segment reporting may differ from earnings measurement at the firm level, 
focusing on the reconciliation from segment-to-firm-level earnings is essential to determine whether these 
reconciliations are important to firm valuation. Ultimately, it is still unclear ex ante whether SFAS No. 131 should 
improve earnings predictability, earnings quality or mitigate any segment-related mispricing. A number of studies 
have concluded that giving management discretion under GAAP deteriorates earnings quality and predictability (see 
literature review by Dechow and Skinner, 2000). In contrast, other studies have concluded that giving management 
discretion under GAAP improves earnings quality and predictability (e.g., Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000). 
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Firm-Segment Reconcilable Difference 
 
Firm-to-segment reconciliations (i.e., SERs) provide a reconciliation of the reported segment financial 
information disclosed by applying the management approach prescribed under the SFAS No. 131 reporting regime 
to the consolidated financial information reported by the firm. This reconciliation may include differences in 
earnings measurement– management approach earnings measurement at the segment level, segments that do not 
meet the reporting requirement threshold, unallocated costs or expenses and/or unallocated revenue or gains. Firms 
provide information about the earnings (both sales and expenses) measurement differences that exist between their 
aggregated segment earnings and consolidated earnings. These firms vary widely in the level of detail they provide 
for their segment disclosure in their annual report. Refer to Appendix A for an example of segment earnings 
disclosure and its corresponding reconciliation to consolidated firm earnings. 
 
Two concurrent studies, Alfonso et. al (2010) and Ettredge and Wang (2010),  examine the determinants of 
SERs.  Ettredge and Wang (2010) examine the determinants of SERs (they refer to them as GAPs in their study) and 
investigate whether aggregated segment earnings are more persistent and informative than corporate (i.e., firm-level) 
earnings when SERs exist. Their results suggest that when SERs exist, the aggregated segment earnings are 
modestly more persistent than corporate earnings. This difference appears to be attributable to negative SERs. When 
negative SERs exist, the aggregated segment earnings are more informative (in terms of its association with 
concurrent stock returns) than corporate earnings. When positive SERs exist, summed segment income has a weaker 
association with concurrent stock returns than corporate earnings. Our study differs from Ettredge and Wang (2010) 
given that we focus on the persistence and mispricing of SERs. 
 
Alfonso et al. (2010) provide evidence that SERs are value-relevant and that firm-segment reconcilable 
differences do matter to the capital markets. In addition, using a determinants model, they focus on managers’ 
decisions to report SERs. They find that the reporting of SERs can be significantly influenced by agency costs. This 
study finds that larger firms and firms with higher leverage and higher ROA are more likely to report aggregated 
segment-level earnings less than firm-level earnings (SER>0). Furthermore, this study finds that firms with a greater 
number of segments, greater accruals, a loss, greater aggregated segment profits and a Big N auditor are less likely 
to report SER>0. Firms in which the agency cost motive dominates are twice as likely to report SER>0 as are firms 
in which the agency cost motive does not dominate, which suggests that managers’ segment reporting choice is 
partly driven by agency costs. Thus, consistent with the agency theory, we expect managers to conceal information 
from the shareholders, thereby decreasing firm transparency, increasing uncertainty about the firm and resulting in 
market mispricing for these firms. Alternatively, consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis, we expect that 
managers will conceal information from competitors (Berger and Hann, 2003), thereby indirectly concealing 
information from investors. Our study contributes to prior research by being one of the early studies to examine 
SERs, and contributes to the understanding of segment disclosure practices by examining a unique setting in which 
management has discretion, based on how the firm is managed internally, to report segment information in a manner 
that may not be consistent with firm-level GAAP-reported earnings measurements. It further contributes to our 
understanding of market pricing as it relates to segment earnings under the SFAS No. 131 reporting regime. 
 
Research Design 
 
The primary focus of this paper is to test whether the market correctly prices firms’ securities relative to the 
persistence of the aggregated segment and SER components of earnings. In order to evaluate whether mispricing 
occurs for the aggregated segment and SER components of earnings, we first examine the persistence of segment-
based earnings by decomposing consolidated firm-level earnings into aggregated segment earnings and an SER 
component of earnings. As with earnings, both components are subject to different levels of measurement errors and 
non-recurring problems and, therefore, should persist differentially from overall firm-level earnings as well as have 
different valuation implications. Chen and Zhang (2003) show that aggregated weighted average segment earnings, 
which they refer to as divergence of profitability, are incrementally persistent to consolidated earnings about future 
firm consolidated earnings. They also show that the aggregated segment component is important for firm valuation. 
This study differs from Chen and Zhang (2003), which focused on the pre-SFAS No. 131 period, in that we focus on 
the SER component of earnings and whether it is informative beyond the aggregated segment earnings component 
subsequent to SFAS No. 131. 
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If the objective of SFAS No. 131 is successful in providing more useful (i.e., better earnings 
quality/predictability) information to investors, then ultimately we should find no (or less) mispricing. Accordingly, 
since SERs represent the reconcilable earnings differences between what is reported using the ‘management 
approach’ and what is reported using ‘GAAP’ for consolidated earnings, the reconcilable difference would be the 
information (i.e., differences in recognizing revenue, allocating costs, unreportable segments, intersegment 
transactions, etc.) that exists between the two accounting measurement approaches. Consistent with SFAS No. 131’s 
objective of making segment information more meaningful, we expect the SER component of earnings to be 
persistent and have no (or lower) mispricing. Given the findings in prior research (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2003), the 
aggregated segment component should be positive and significant. It is important to note that our tests are focused 
primarily on SERs when they are not equal to zero, and we include aggregated segment earnings as an important 
within-firm control. 
 
We use equation (1) to establish a benchmark for earnings persistence. Next, we determine whether the 
persistence of the SER component of earnings is incremental to the aggregated segment component of earnings. If 
these components are equally persistent, then the next period’s earnings can be depicted equally by the bivariate 
model in equation (1) as it can be by the multivariate model in equation (2). 
 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1EARNt + t+1  (1) 
 
EARNt+1 = β0 + β1AGSEG t + β2SERt + t+1 (2) 
 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARNt+1 - 0 - 1
* 
EARNt) + t+1 (3) 
 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARNt+1 - 0
*
 - 1
*
AGSEGt - 2
*
SERt) + t+1 (4) 
 
where EARN is earnings before interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); 
AGSEG is the sum of segment operating profits excluding all corporate, reconciliation and elimination segments 
scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SERt is the firm-segment difference defined as EARN minus AGSEG.  
BHRET is the return accumulation period that begins four months after the end of the fiscal year, and size-adjusted 
returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of firms having similar market values. 
 
The primary focus of this paper is to test whether the market correctly prices securities of firms with one or 
more reported segments relative to the persistence of aggregated segments and SER components of earnings.
2
 
Similar to Sloan (1996), Thomas (2000) and Hope et al. (2008), we use hedge portfolios to determine whether stock 
prices reflect the different properties of the SER component of earnings. In other words, we examine whether 
investors can earn abnormal profits by following a trading strategy of going long (short) in firms with the highest 
(lowest) SER.
3
 
 
We use an alternative naïve expectation model, against which to test the null hypothesis of market 
efficiency. Therefore, to test the rational expectations hypotheses, we employ the framework developed by Mishkin 
(1983) using equations (1) and (3). Mishkin (1983) suggests that equation (3) provides an estimate of the market’s 
                                                 
2 We include firms with one segment when segment earnings do not equal consolidated earnings reported. We do so to account 
for unreported segments (not required to be reported since it does not fall within the threshold established for reporting it), which 
is part of our segment earnings reconciliation. 
3One can test whether the market is efficient with respect to earnings forecasts even if there are omitted variables. However, one 
cannot test whether the market is efficient with respect to specific variables in the forecasting equation (e.g., SER) if the variables 
omitted from the forecasting equation are not (themselves) rationally priced and if they are also correlated with the variables of 
interest in the forecasting equation (e.g., SER). Based on the Mishkin Test (Mishkin, 1983), one can reject efficiency (at least 
with respect to the assumed equilibrium model of returns) even if the forecasting equation has omitted variables, but one cannot 
draw inferences about which accounting variable or variables are the source of the inefficiency. Given this and the findings in 
Kraft et al. (2007), we primarily focus our analysis in this study on hedge portfolio strategies similar to Thomas (2000) and Hope 
et al. (2008) to draw our conclusions with respect to market mispricing. 
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perceived time-series behavior of earnings. 1
* 
in equation (3) is an estimate of the extent to which the market 
perceives earnings to persist in the future. 
 
As discussed early in the paper, some argue that segment information reported under the SFAS No. 131 
reporting regime is more useful, while others argue that segment reporting now lacks comparability and consistency 
and refer to it as the ‘unstandard standard’. To test whether investors fail to accurately distinguish between the 
aggregated segment and SER (i.e., segment reconciliation) components of earnings, we test equations (2) and (4). 
Earnings expectations are permitted to reflect the overall level of persistence in earnings performance, but are 
hypothesized not to reflect the differential degrees of persistence attributable to the aggregated segment and SER 
components of earnings. 1
* 
in equation (4) is an estimate of the extent to which the market perceives aggregated 
segments component of earnings to persist in the future. 2
* 
in equation (4) is an estimate of the extent to which 
the market perceives the SER component of earnings to persist in the future. 
 
 To test market efficiency, we compare coefficients (1= 1* and 2= 2*) from equations (2) and (4). This 
constraint assumes that stock prices correctly anticipate the average persistence of earnings performance. If the 
coefficients are not significantly different, then no mispricing occurs for these two components of earnings. The 
equality of the coefficients across equations is tested using the likelihood ratio statistic suggested by Mishkin (1983). 
 
Kraft et al. (2007) indicate that it is important to include accounting variables while examining the rational 
pricing of earnings components in the Mishkin tests. Thus, we include variables used in Kraft et al. (2007) in 
equations (5)-(8). 
 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1EARNt + iCONTROLi+t+1 (5) 
 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARNt+1 - 0 - 1
* 
EARNt - i
*
CONTROLi)+ t+1 (6) 
 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1AGSEGt + 2
 
SERt + iCONTROLi + t+1 (7) 
 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARNt+1 - 0
*
 - 1
*
AGSEGt - 2
*
SERt- i
*
CONTROLi) + t+1 (8) 
 
where CONTROL represents the control variables: SALES, CHSALES, CAPEX and CHCAPEX. SALES is sales 
scaled by total assets (compustat #12/ compustat #6);  CHSALES is the change in sales from t−1 to t scaled by 
assets ((compustat #12 – lag compustat #12)/ compustat #6); CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
(compustat #30/ compustat #6); CHCAPEX is the change in capital expenditures scaled by assets ((compustat #30 − 
lag compustat #30)/ compustat #6). Because we use the size-adjusted return as the dependent variable, we do not 
include the decile as an independent variable as in Kraft et al. (2007). 
 
Additionally, to test whether there is market mispricing or a shifting of risk, the relation between current 
SERs and the aggregated segment component of earnings and one and two year-ahead stock returns is estimated. If 
the abnormal returns in year t+1 are the result of the market failing to understand how SERs in year t relates to total 
earnings in year t+1, then we should expect the market to correct fully for this mispricing when earnings in year t+1 
are reported. If so, then abnormal returns should not persist beyond year t+1. If the abnormal returns are due to 
SERs being a measure of risk, then these returns are likely to persist beyond year t+1. We assume market mispricing 
is more likely to cause only a short-term relation with abnormal returns as in Thomas (2000). We use equations (9) 
and (10) to determine whether there is a mispricing or a shift or risk. 
 
BHRETt+1 = 0 + 1EARN t + εt+1  (9) 
 
BHRETt+1 = µ0 + µ1AGSEGt + µ2SERt + εt+1 (10) 
 
BHRETt+2 = 0 + 1EARN t + εt+1  (11) 
 
BHRETt+2 = µ0 + µ1AGSEGt + µ2SERt + εt+1 (12) 
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SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Our initial sample includes firms listed on Compustat’s Annual Industrial, Research, and Full Coverage 
files and industry segment data, which are available on Compustat’s industry segment file from 1998 to 2006. We 
require the observations from the segment files to only include the source year observations so that restatements of 
segment performance will not influence our results. The aggregated segment earnings (AGSEG) are defined as the 
sum of operating profit after depreciation (OPS) from all reported business segments scaled by total assets 
(compustat #6), 
 
AGSEG = ∑ni=1OPSi / TA (13) 
 
where n represents the number of reported business segments of the firm. We exclude observations when there is a 
footnote associated with OPS, since differences that exist between the data as reported by the company and the 
Compustat definition will be indicated by a footnote. The firm-level earnings (EARN) are defined as operating profit 
after depreciation from the annual Compustat file (compustat #178) scaled by total assets (compustat #6). The firm-
segment reconcilable difference (SER) is the difference between EARN and AGSEG. 
 
Following the extant literature, we exclude firms in the financial and ‘other’ industries based on the 
industry classification in Fama and French (1997) and firms that have data missing from the Compustat and CRSP 
databases. Firms must be covered in CRSP NYSE/AMEX capitalization deciles. We omit firms with mergers and 
acquisitions to allow appropriate comparisons. We also exclude observations where annual sales are less than 20 
million dollars. Since SFAS No. 131 is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997, we exclude 
Compustat observations in 1998 if the firm’s fiscal year ends between June-November. We exclude observations 
with SER equal to zero since the focus of this study is on the reconciliations between segment-level and firm-level 
earnings (i.e., SERs). Our final sample selection criterion yields 649 unique firms and 1,717 firm-year observations.  
 
Table 1 presents the sample descriptive statistics.
4
 To determine whether the fact that SERs are positive or 
negative plays a significant role, we perform our primary analysis based on the sign of the SER. We find that both 
negative and positive SERs exist and are significant. Panel A of Table 1 reports and compares the descriptive 
statistics for firms with SER>0 and SER<0. The mean of the positive (negative) SERs is significant with a mean of 
0.020 and a t-value of 17.84 (mean = -0.028, t-value = -19.45). The two groups of firms do not differ significantly in 
terms of capital expenditures, total accruals, leverage and firm size. On the other hand, earnings, aggregated segment 
earnings, sales, return on equity, return on assets, operating cash flows and firm growth are significantly greater for 
negative SER firms. This suggests that firms that report aggregated segment earnings greater than firm-level 
consolidated earnings may be better off financially. Positive SER firms are generally larger and have more total 
accruals. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports and compares the descriptive statistics for firms with SER=0 and SER≠0. The 
two groups of firms do not differ significantly in terms of aggregated segment earnings, return on equity, total 
accruals and firm leverage. Firms that report positive or negative SERs tend to have more capital expenditures and 
are larger in size. However, they are less profitable, have less earnings, operating cash flows, sales and firm growth 
than firms with no (i.e., zero) SERs reported. Hence, on average, it appears that firms reporting SERs not equal to 
zero may be a little less financially better off than firms with zero SERs reported. 
                                                 
4 We winsorize all variables at the one percent and ninety-nine percent levels before we provide the statistics. The mean of SER 
is different from the difference of the mean of EARN and the mean of AGSEG, because EARN, AGSEG and SER may not be 
winsorized at the same time for one observation. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with SER<0 and SER>0 
  SER>0 SER<0 SER>0 Minus SER<0 
  N Mean Median std t Value N Mean Median std t Value t-value Probt 
EARN 788 0.072 0.068 0.071 28.16 929 0.080 0.072 0.077 31.71 -2.27 0.024 
AGSEG 788 0.052 0.055 0.084 17.33 929 0.110 0.096 0.089 37.91 -14 <.0001 
SER 788 0.020 0.008 0.031 17.84 929 -0.028 -0.011 0.044 -19.45 26.27 <.0001 
SALES 788 1.106 0.956 0.728 42.67 929 1.208 1.049 0.799 46.11 -2.77 0.006 
CHSALES 788 0.015 0.021 0.192 2.2 929 0.038 0.044 0.222 5.15 -2.25 0.025 
CAPEX 788 184.964 53.676 389.128 13.34 929 192.580 53.250 421.720 13.92 -0.39 0.697 
CHCAPEX 788 -0.002 0.000 0.030 -1.52 929 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.11 -1.14 0.256 
ROE 788 0.028 0.078 0.314 2.47 929 0.090 0.105 0.306 8.95 -4.15 <.0001 
ROA 788 0.019 0.026 0.074 7.31 929 0.042 0.042 0.074 17.39 -6.5 <.0001 
TACC 716 -0.008 -0.001 0.063 -3.24 872 -0.002 0.001 0.056 -1.15 -1.8 0.072 
CFO 716 0.072 0.070 0.085 22.54 869 0.088 0.088 0.083 31.32 -3.9 <.0001 
LEVERAGE 787 0.246 0.240 0.177 39.09 929 0.237 0.212 0.182 39.71 1.01 0.311 
GROWTH 788 0.039 0.031 0.172 6.36 929 0.064 0.052 0.193 10.18 -2.89 0.004 
LOGSIZE 788 7.160 7.100 1.728 116.33 929 7.004 7.074 1.748 122.15 1.85 0.065 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
Descriptive Statistics 
   
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with SER=0 and SER≠0 
  SER=0 SER≠0 SER=0 Minus SER≠0 
  N Mean Median std t Value N Mean Median std t Value t-value Probt 
EARN 2,291 0.086 0.081 0.100 41.17 1,717 0.076 0.070 0.074 42.35 3.76 0.0002 
AGSEG 2,291 0.086 0.081 0.100 41.17 1,717 0.084 0.074 0.091 37.89 0.91 0.3638 
SER 2,291 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 1,717 -0.006 0.000 0.046 -5.74 5.74 <.0001 
SALES 2,291 1.231 1.061 0.893 65.96 1,717 1.161 1.009 0.768 62.63 2.64 0.0083 
CHSALES 2,291 0.055 0.045 0.227 11.64 1,717 0.027 0.033 0.209 5.39 4.04 <.0001 
CAPEX 2,291 153.247 25.376 360.537 20.34 1,717 189.085 53.600 406.987 19.25 -2.9 0.0038 
CHCAPEX 2,291 0.001 0.001 0.057 0.81 1,717 -0.001 0.000 0.032 -0.88 1.16 0.246 
ROE 2,291 0.071 0.107 0.410 8.25 1,717 0.061 0.091 0.311 8.17 0.81 0.4195 
ROA 2,291 0.043 0.043 0.095 21.53 1,717 0.032 0.033 0.075 17.57 4.08 <.0001 
TACC 2,145 -0.001 0.001 0.068 -0.58 1,588 -0.005 0.000 0.059 -3.12 1.81 0.07 
CFO 2,143 0.090 0.089 0.105 39.68 1,585 0.081 0.081 0.084 38.11 3.11 0.0019 
LEVERAGE 2,291 0.236 0.203 0.214 52.93 1,716 0.241 0.226 0.180 55.66 -0.8 0.4247 
GROWTH 2,290 0.083 0.057 0.218 18.34 1,717 0.053 0.044 0.184 11.88 4.82 <.0001 
LOGSIZE 2,291 6.332 6.299 1.736 174.53 1,717 7.076 7.091 1.740 168.52 -13.41 <.0001 
The bolded t-statistics are significant at less than a <.01, .05, or .10 significance level. EARN is earnings before interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets 
(compustat #6); AGSEG is the sum of segment operating profits excluding all corporate, reconciliation, and elimination segments scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SER 
is firm-segment difference defined as EARN minus AGSEG; SALES is sales scaled by total assets (compustat #12/ compustat #6);  CHSALES is the change in sales from t−1 to t 
scaled by assets ((compustat #12 – lag compustat #12)/ compustat #6); CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets (compustat #30/ compustat #6); CHCAPEX is the 
change in capital expenditures scaled by assets ((compustat #30 − lag compustat #30)/ compustat #6); ROE is income before extraordinary tems over average equity (compustat 
#18 /average compustat #216 at t and t-1); ROA is return on assets (compustat #18 / average compustat #6 at t and t-1); TACC is total accrual scaled by total assets (((compustat 
#4-LAG(compustat #4)) - (compustat #5-LAG(compustat #5)) - (compustat #1-LAG(compustat #1)) + (compustat #34 - LAG(compustat #34)) - compustat #14)) / compustat #6); 
CFO is cash flow scaled by total assets ((compustat #18 – TACC) / compustat #6); LEVERAGE is leverage ratio defined as long-term debt over total assets (compustat #9 / 
compustat #6); GROWTH is firm’s sales growth ((compustat #12- average compustat #12 at t and t-1)/LAG compustat #12);LOGSIZE is log of total assets (log (compustat #6)). 
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Figure 1 
Illustration of Firm-Segment Reconcilable Differences 
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The y-axis are abnormal returns and the x-axis are the number of portfolios. SER is firm-segment difference defined as 
EARNt minus AGSEGt. The size-adjusted returns (BHRET) are computed by taking the raw buy-old return, inclusive of 
dividends and liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold return on a size matched, value-weighted portfolio of firms. 
The size portfolios are based on the market value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. The decile rankings and decile 
returns are supplied by CRSP. The return accumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal year and size-
adjusted returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of 
firms having similar market values.  
Figure 2 
Hedge Portfolio Abnormal Returns: SER<0 and SER>0 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Table 2 reports results from the estimation of equations (1) and (2) to establish the persistence in earnings 
performance and a benchmark for earnings mispricing. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Sloan, 1996), we find a 
significantly positive coefficient of 0.911 (0.914) for current period earnings in firms with positive (negative) SERs. 
The results from the estimation of equation (2) show that both AGSEG and SERs are incrementally persistent in 
providing information about future earnings. As shown in Table 2, the AGSEG component coefficient of firms with 
positive SERs is significantly positive (coefficient = .863, p-value <.0001). The SER component is also significantly 
positive (coefficient = 1.178, p-value <.0001). These results indicate that both aggregated segment earnings and 
SERs have significant implications for future firm consolidated earnings. However, only when firms report positive 
SERs are AGSEG and SER differentially persistent (0.863 versus 1.178). The coefficient of SER for firms with 
SER>0 is significantly larger than that of AGSEG for firms with positive SERs (F-test = 38.15, p-value <.0001). 
Our results suggest that the SER component is more persistent than the AGSEG component for firms with positive 
SER. Although both the AGSEG and SER are persistent and significantly positive (coefficient=.873, p-value 
<.0001; coefficient=.844, p-value <.0001, respectively), the coefficient of the SER component is not significantly 
different from that of the AGSEG component for firms with negative SERs (F-test=.52, p-value=.470). 
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Table 2 
Persistence of Earnings, Aggregated Earnings, and Firm-Segment Difference 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1EARNt + t+1   (1) 
EARNt+1 = β0 + β1AGSEG t + β2SERt + t+1  (2) 
 
Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 
SER>0 SER<0 SER>0 SER<0 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.554 0.0024 0.101 0.4352 0.231 0.2178 -0.282 0.0591 
EARN 0.911 <.0001 0.914 <.0001 
    AGSEG 
    
0.863 <.0001 0.873 <.0001 
SER 
    
1.178 <.0001 0.844 <.0001 
Obs.  788 
 
929 
 
788 
 
929 
 R-Square 0.785 
 
0.791 
 
0.785 
 
0.765 
 Adj R-Sq 0.784 
 
0.79 
 
0.784 
 
0.765 
 F Value: Equation 1432.58 <.0001 1751.23 <.0001 956.26 <.0001 1006.18 <.0001 
F Value: AGSEG=SER 
    
38.15 <.0001 0.52 0.4703 
The bolded two-tailed p-values are significant at less than a <.01, .05, or .10 significance level. EARN is earnings before interest 
and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); AGSEG is the sum of segment operating profits excluding 
all corporate, reconciliation, and elimination segments scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SER is firm-segment difference 
defined as EARNt minus AGSEGt.  
 
 
Table 3 
Results of Market Efficiency Tests 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1EARNt + t+1 (1) 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1AGSEG t + 2
 SERt  + t+1 (2) 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARN t+1 - 0 - 1
* EARNt) + t+1 (3) 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARN t+1 - 0
* - 1
*AGSEGt - 2
*SER t) + t+1 (4) 
 Equations (1) and (2) Equations (3) and (4) 
Equation SER>0 SER<0 SER>0 SER<0 
1 0.911 0.914 0.863 0.873 
1
* 0.847 0.822 0.929 0.734 
2   1.178 0.844 
2
*   -0.151 1.018 
1=1 26.18 29.66   
 <.0001 <.0001   
1=1
* 0.48 1.47 0.39 1.82 
 0.489 0.225 0.533 0.178 
2=2
*   19.61 0.37 
   <.0001 0.543 
1=1
*, 2=2
*   20.73 4.88 
   <.0001 0.087 
Obs. Used 788 929 788 929 
The bolded two-tailed p-values are significant at less than a <.01, .05, or .10 significance level. EARN = is earnings before 
interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); AGSEG = is the sum of segment operating profits 
excluding all corporate, reconciliation, and elimination segments scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SER = is firm-
segment difference defined as EARN minus AGSEG. The size-adjusted returns (BHRET) are computed by taking the raw buy-
old return, inclusive of dividends and liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold return on a size matched, value-
weighted portfolio of firms. The size portfolios are based on the market value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. The 
return accumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal year and size-adjusted returns are computed by 
measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of firms having similar market 
values.  
 
 
Table 3 reports the results for the estimations of equations (1)-(4). For firms with SER>0 (SER<0) in 
column 2 (3), the estimate of actual total earnings persistence (1) is .911 (.914), and the estimate of the market’s 
perceived total earnings persistence is (1
*
) is .847 (.822) in tests using equations (1) and (3). The difference in 
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actual earnings persistence (1) and the market’s perception of earnings persistence (1
*
) is not significant (p-
value=.489 as SER>0, p-value=.225 as SER<0, respectively). Thus, the market appears to incorporate this earnings 
information into stock prices appropriately. For firms with SER>0 (SER<0) in column 4 (5), the estimate of 
aggregated segment earnings persistence (1) is .863 (.873), and the estimate of the market’s perceived aggregated 
segment earnings persistence is (1
*
) is .929 (.734) in tests using equations (2) and (4). The difference in aggregated 
segment earnings persistence (1) and the market’s perception of aggregate segment earnings persistence (1
*
) is 
not significant (p-value=.533 as SER>0, p-value=.178 as SER<0, respectively). The estimate of SERs persistence 
(2) is 1.178 (.844), and the estimate of the market’s perceived SERs persistence is (2
*
) is -.151 (1.018) for the 
SER>0 (SER<0) subset. For firms with SER>0, the difference in SER persistence (2) and the market’s perception 
of SER persistence (2
*
) is significant (p-value=<.0001). In contrast, for firms with SER<0, the difference in SER 
persistence and the market’s perception of SER persistence is not significant (p-value=.543). These findings suggest 
that the market understands and incorporates aggregated segment earnings and SER components of earnings into 
stock prices appropriately when SER<0. However, when firms report SER>0, the results suggest that stock prices do 
not accurately reflect the time-series properties of SERs. Specifically, securities prices underestimate the extent to 
which the SERs persist, thereby causing stock prices to lag earnings. 
 
 
Table 4 
Results of Market Efficiency Tests – with Control Variables 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1EARNt + iCONTROLi+t+1 (5) 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARN t+1 - 0 - 1
* EARNt - i
*CONTROLi)+ t+1 (6) 
EARNt+1 = 0 + 1AGSEG t + 2
 SERt  + iCONTROLi + t+1 (7) 
BHRETt+1 = β (EARN t+1 - 0
* - 1
*AGSEGt - 2
*SER t- i
*CONTROLi) + t+1 (8) 
 Equations (5) and (6) Equations (7) and (8) 
 Equation SER>0 SER<0 SER>0 SER<0 
1 0.847 0.858 0.813 0.793 
1
* 1.126 0.873 1.137 0.702 
2   1.036 0.856 
2
*   0.218 0.997 
1=1 44.22 40.86   
 <.0001 <.0001   
1=1
* 3.7 0.02 4.52 0.41 
 0.055 0.889 0.033 0.521 
2=2
*   4.34 0.23 
   0.037 0.635 
1=1
*, 2=2
*   14.29 1.27 
   0.001 0.530 
Obs. Used 788 929 788 929 
The bolded two-tailed p-values are significant at less than a <.01, .05, or .10 significance level.  EARN = is earnings before 
interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); AGSEG = is the sum of segment operating profits 
excluding all corporate, reconciliation, and elimination segments scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SER = is firm-
segment difference defined as EARN minus AGSEG. CONTROL represents the control variables: SALES, CHSALES, CAPEX, 
and CHCAPEX. SALES is sales scaled by total assets (compustat #12/ compustat #6); CHSALES is the change in sales from t−1 
to t scaled by assets ((compustat #12 – lag compustat #12)/ compustat #6); CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
(compustat #30/ compustat #6); CHCAPEX is the change in capital expenditures scaled by assets ((compustat #30 − lag 
compustat #30)/ compustat #6). The size-adjusted returns (BHRET) are computed by taking the raw buy-old return, inclusive of 
dividends and liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold return on a size matched, value-weighted portfolio of firms. 
The size portfolios are based on the market value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. The return accumulation period 
begins four months after the end of the fiscal year and size-adjusted returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in 
excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of firms having similar market values. 
 
 
In Table 4, we report the results of equations (5)-(8), in which control variables are included in the original 
Mishkin test equations. The results differ somewhat from those reported in Table 3 with respect to the AGSEG 
component of earnings. Tables 3 and 4 both show that the market significantly underestimates the SER component 
when SER>0. This empirical finding again suggest that investors cannot properly interpret this management 
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approach to segment financial reporting when SER>0.  Therefore, potential opportunities may exist for market 
participants to earn abnormal profits as a result of this market mispricing. In contrast to Table 3, when the control 
variables are added to the equation, we find that the AGSEG component becomes positively significant. This 
indicates that both the aggregated segment (which is essentially ‘management approach accounting’) and SER 
components of earnings are both mispriced (i.e., underestimated). This finding further strengthens our conclusions 
from Table 3. 
 
Table 5 
Buy-Hold Returns of the Portfolios 
  
SER>0 
BHRET  
SER<0 
BHRET 
Portfolio SER Ranking N Mean t Value N Mean t Value 
1(Highest) 76 0.4039 4.24 91 0.0495 0.88 
2 78 0.2030 2.4 93 0.0634 1.03 
3 79 0.3040 3.27 93 0.1169 1.93 
4 81 0.1946 2.66 93 0.1672 3.48 
5 79 0.1190 1.91 92 0.1772 3.58 
6 79 0.1276 2.13 96 0.1196 2.19 
7 82 0.1194 2.14 94 0.2315 3.40 
8 78 0.0285 0.63 92 0.1473 2.34 
9 79 0.0201 0.48 94 0.2933 3.64 
10 (Lowest) 77 0.0669 1.31 91 0.2759 2.87 
The t-statistics are based on the time-series of the annual portfolio abnormal stock returns. SER is firm-segment difference 
defined as EARNt minus AGSEGt. The size-adjusted returns (BHRET) are computed by taking the raw buy-old return, 
inclusive of dividends and liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold return on a size matched, value-weighted 
portfolio of firms. The size portfolios are based on the market value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. The decile 
rankings and decile returns are supplied by CRSP. The return accumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal 
year and size-adjusted returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-
weighted portfolio of firms having similar market values. The hedge portfolio consists of a long position in the highest value SER 
portfolio and a short position in the lowest value SER portfolio. The bolded t-statistics are significant at less than a <.01, .05, or 
.10 significance level.   
 
 
Table 5 provides statistics on the characteristics of the decile portfolios formed by ranking firms on the 
value of the SER component of earnings and reports the portfolio mean and median values for the buy-hold returns. 
Abnormal stock returns may be earned by exploiting an investor’s inability to distinguish correctly between the 
aggregated segment and SER components of earnings. The economic significance of deviations from market 
efficiency can be assessed by examining the returns of a trading strategy based on the magnitude of the SER 
component of earnings. Firms are ranked on the value of the SER component of earnings and assigned in equal 
numbers to ten portfolios each year. A separate abnormal return is then computed for each portfolio for the years in 
the sample, where the return cumulation period begins four months after the fiscal year in which SERs are 
measured. Abnormal returns are measured using size-adjusted returns. If the market fixates on aggregated segment 
earnings, then those firms experiencing the largest SERs are more likely to have undervalued stocks for firms with 
positive SERs (i.e., SER>0). Table 5 reports the size-adjusted returns for the first year following portfolio formation. 
Portfolio abnormal returns increase from 6.69% for the lowest positive SER portfolio to 40.39% for the highest 
positive SER portfolio. Hence, the greater (i.e., more positive) the SER, the greater the abnormal returns. For firms 
with negative SERs (i.e., SER<0), the hedge portfolio produces statistically positive and significant abnormal 
returns that decrease from 27.59% for the lowest SER portfolio to 4.95% for the highest SER portfolio. In contrast 
to firms with positive SERs, firms with negative SER experience decreasing abnormal returns as the value of the 
SER become more negative. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the portfolio stock returns. The market returns in 
most portfolios are significantly different from zero and positive. Figure 2 presents a continuum using all 20 
portfolios (from most negative to most positive SERs) to reveal a U-shaped distribution of returns. The graph 
suggests that absolute SERs provide the best hedge profits. Although we cannot determine whether the increase in 
abnormal returns as SERs increase is a function of increased risk, good news, or a combination of both for these 
firms, we do find that there is no shifting of risk for these firms (see Table 7). 
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Table 6 reports the returns to a hedge portfolio, taking a long position in the highest value of the SER 
portfolio and an equally valued short position in the lowest value of the SER portfolio.  For firms with positive 
SERs (i.e., SER>0), the returns to a hedge portfolio taking a long position in the highest portfolio and an equally 
valued short position in the lowest portfolio is 33.7% (t-value = 3.12, p-value = .0023). For firms with negative 
SERs (SER<0), the returns to a hedge portfolio taking a long position in the highest portfolio and an equally valued 
short position in the lowest portfolio is -22.6% (t-value = -2.03, p-value = .0438) for firms with negative SER. Our 
findings indicate that it is possible to make abnormal profits by following a trading strategy focused on the value of 
SERs. Specifically, we find an economically meaningful and statistically significant positive return to going long in 
firms in the top deciles of the value of SERs and going short in firms in the lowest deciles of the value of the SER 
component of earnings for firms with SER>0. Moreover, most of the abnormal returns come from the long position, 
not the short position. In contrast, for firms with SER<0, we find that the same trading strategy results in negative 
abnormal returns. This finding is mainly the result of the more significant abnormal returns occurring as negative 
SERs are decreasing (lowest portfolio) rather than increasing (highest portfolio). Overall, our results suggest that 
market participants cannot adequately interpret the firm-to-segment reconciliations resulting from ‘management 
approach’ accounting information, thereby causing them to underestimate the significance of these reconciliations 
(i.e., SERs).  
 
 
Table 6 
Buy-Hold Returns of the Portfolios 
  
Portfolio with Highest value of SER (Portfolio 1) 
minus 
Portfolio with Lowest value of SER (Portfolio 10) 
  SER>0 SER<0 
 mean t-value p-value mean t-value p-value 
BHRET 0.337 3.12 0.0023 -0.226 -2.03 0.0438 
SER 0.099 23.69 <.0001 0.144 31.69 <.0001 
EARN -0.009 -0.65 0.5176 0.018 1.41 0.1616 
AGSEG -0.115 -7.79 <.0001 -0.145 -9.8 <.0001 
The hedge portfolio consists of a long position in the highest value of SER and an offsetting short position in the lowest 
value of SER. BHRET is calculated as the return accumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal year and 
size-adjusted returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of firms having similar market values; EARN is earnings before interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm 
total assets (compustat #6); AGSEG is the sum of segment operating profits excluding all corporate, reconciliation, and 
elimination segments scaled by firm total assets (compustat #6); SER is firm-segment difference defined as EARNt minus 
AGSEGt. Portfolios are formed annually by assigning firms into deciles based on the magnitude of SERs in year t. The t-
statistics are based o the time-series of the annual portfolio abnormal stock returns. The size-adjusted returns (BHRET) are 
computed by taking the raw buy-old return, inclusive of dividends and liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold 
return on a size matched, value-weighted portfolio of firms. The size portfolios are based on the market value of equity deciles of 
NYSE and AMEX firms. The decile rankings and decile returns are supplied by CRSP. The return accumulation period begins 
four months after the end of the fiscal year and size-adjusted returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of 
the buy-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of firms having similar market values. The bolded two-tailed p-values are 
significant at less than a <.01, .05, or .10 significance level.   
 
 
Table 7 reports the results of equations (9)-(12): the mean coefficients of cross-sectional regressions of 
abnormal returns in years t+1 and t+2 on AGSEG and SER components of earnings at year t. If abnormal returns are 
due to SERs being a measure of risk, then these returns are likely to persist beyond year t+1. As shown, there is no 
significant relation between AGSEGt and abnormal returns in either t+1 or t+2. When SER>0, the relation between 
SERt and abnormal returns in year t+1 is significantly positive (coefficient = 2.051, p-value =.005). However, in 
year t+2, the relation is no longer significant, suggesting that the mispricing is not a shifting of risk. In contrast, 
when SER>0, the relation between SERt and abnormal returns in years t+2 is not significant (coefficient = .868, p-
value =.183). Hence, the evidence suggests that the market misprices the persistence of positive SERs in year t, but 
then corrects fully for this mispricing in year t+1. For SER<0, there is no statistically significant relation between 
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stock returns and AGSEG or SER. This suggests that there is no significant mispricing for negative SERs.
5
 Since the 
abnormal returns do not persist beyond year t+1, the segment reconciliation component of earnings does not appear 
to be a measure of risk. 
 
 
Table 7 
Future Buy-Hold Returns 
Panel A: One-year Future buy-hold return 
BHRETt+1= 0 + 1EARNt + εt+1  (9) 
BHRETt+1= µ0 + µ1AGSEGt + µ2SERt  + εt+1 (10) 
 
 
SER>0 SER<0 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.563 0.532 -0.063 0.980 -0.689 0.606 -1.568 0.290 
EARN 0.142 0.612 
  
-0.080 0.677 
  AGSEG 
  
-0.006 0.984 
  
-0.188 0.330 
SER 
  
2.051 0.005 
  
-0.927 0.077 
Obs.  311 
 
311 
 
440 
 
440 
 R-Square 0.002 
 
0.028 
 
0.001 
 
0.0081 
 Adj R-Sq -0.003 
 
0.018 
 
-0.003 
 
0.0012 
 F Value 0.41 0.6622 2.97 0.0322 0.28 0.756 1.18 0.316 
 
Panel B: Two-year Future buy-hold return 
BHRETt+2 = 0 + 1EARNt + εt+1  (11) 
BHRETt+2 = µ0 + µ1AGSEG t + µ2SERt  + εt+1 (12) 
 
SER>0 SER<0 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.495 0.825 -0.141 0.951 1.295 0.349 0.191 0.901 
EARN 0.117 0.643 
  
0.035 0.863 
  AGSEG 
  
0.047 0.857 
  
0.095 0.636 
SER 
  
0.868 0.183 
  
-0.488 0.369 
Obs.  311 
 
311 
 
440 
 
440 
 R-Square 0.001 
 
0.006 
 
0.0023 
 
0.0078 
 Adj R-Sq -0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.0022 
 
0.001 
 F Value 0.16 0.8505 0.63 0.595 0.51 0.599 1.14 0.331 
BHRET is calculated as the return accumulation period begins four months after the end of the fiscal year and size-adjusted 
returns are computed by measuring the buy-hold return in excess of the buy-hold return on a value-weighted portfolio of firms 
having similar market values; EARN is earnings before interest and taxes (compustat #178) scaled by firm total assets (compustat 
#6); AGSEG is the sum of segment operating profits excluding all corporate, reconciliation, and elimination segments scaled by 
firm total assets (compustat #6); SER is firm-segment difference defined as EARN minus AGSEG. 
 
 
Additional Analysis 
 
Although segment reporting under SFAS No. 14 is not the focus of this study, we perform some additional 
analysis to determine whether mispricing occurred prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 131. We conduct the same 
analysis for the pre- and post-SFAS131 period and find, in untabulated results, that the market underestimates the 
SER component in firms with SER>0, but not in firms with SER<0, in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period. This market 
mispricing occurs for the SER component of earnings under both segment-reporting regimes. However, no 
mispricing on the AGSEG component occurred prior to SFAS No. 131. The fact that the AGSEG component was 
not mispriced under the SFAS No. 14 segment-reporting regime, but mispriced under the SFAS No. 131 reporting 
regime, suggests there may have been no significant improvement (from a pricing standpoint) in the information 
environment leading to market inefficiency and potentially decreased transparency in segment reporting in the post-
                                                 
5 When SER<0, the SER component has a p-value of 0.077. To the extent that some consider this p-value significant, then we 
would find significance in year t+1. But similar to the SER>0 firms, we find that the mispricing does not persist beyond t+1, 
suggesting that there is no significant shifting of risk occurring for these firms. 
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SFAS No. 131 period. This result is consistent with Botosan and Harris’s (2005) findings that SFAS No. 131 
resulted in greater overall uncertainty. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Prior research has shown that in certain contexts the market does not fully interpret the extent to which 
current earnings persist into future earnings. As a result, stock prices predictably do not represent the firm value. 
This study contributes to the research by examining whether investors can earn abnormal returns using public 
information about firms’ aggregated segment earnings and their firm-segment reconcilable differences. Overall, our 
empirical findings show that SERs are generally incrementally persistent to the aggregated segments component of 
earnings.  
 
Moreover, we find that stock prices generally fail to fully reflect the information contained in the SER 
component of current earnings when consolidated firm-level earnings are reported higher than aggregated segment 
earnings (i.e., SER>0). This particular finding indicates that when firms report their aggregated segment earnings 
less than their firm earnings, the market does not fully reflect this information and thereby misprices the importance 
of this information (i.e., reconciliation). This may suggest that market participants cannot adequately interpret the 
information provided in the SER (which is essentially the reconciliation of aggregated segment earnings to firm 
earnings that is required as part of the management approach under the SFAS No. 131 segment-reporting regime), 
thereby causing them to misprice the importance of this component of earnings. One plausible explanation is that the 
reconciliation that is being provided by companies is not sufficient for the market to disentangle the differences that 
exist in the reporting between firm ‘GAAP’ earnings measurement and segment ‘management approach’ earnings 
measurement (Caterpillar, Inc. is a good example of this quandary), especially when firms report firm-segment 
differences greater than zero. Another plausible explanation is that the segment reconciliation amounts may consist 
of numbers that managers feel are less important. Firms reporting segment earnings less than consolidated earnings 
may have proprietary costs associated with more segment disclosure. For firms with negative SERs (i.e., SER<0), 
we find that the market understands and incorporates aggregated segment earnings and SER components of earnings 
into stock prices appropriately. 
 
Additionally, the results indicate that it is possible to make abnormal profits by following a trading strategy 
focused on positive SERs where we find significantly positive returns to going long in firms in the top deciles of the 
value of SERs and going short in firms in the lowest deciles of the value of the SER component of earnings. In 
contrast, for firms that report SER<0, we find that the same trading strategy results in negative abnormal returns. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the SEC’s concern with regard to the proper reconciliation of segment 
information to the annually reported earnings. Our empirical findings, along with anecdotal findings, are also 
consistent with the critics that refer to SFAS No. 131 as the ‘unstandard standard’ and their inability to decipher 
segment earnings. Additional analysis also shows that the market does not misprice the aggregated segments or the 
negative SER components of earnings prior to the adoption of SFAS No. l31. 
 
A limitation of this study is that the analyses in this study are not exhaustive, and there are other avenues to 
explore in understanding segment disclosure and segment-to-firm reconciliations (i.e., SER). It is also difficult to 
unequivocally determine whether mispricing is caused by investors’ inability to understand non-GAAP 
measurements or the poor quality of segment information. Nonetheless, this study is the first to examine these 
reconciliations and further contributes to our understanding of segment disclosure practices by examining a unique 
setting in which management has discretion, based on how the firm is managed internally, to report segment 
information in a manner that may not be consistent with firm-level GAAP-reported earnings measurements. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Caterpillar, Inc. 
An Excerpt Example of Reconcilable Differences between  
Firm-Level and Segment-Level Financial Information 
 
We have developed an internal measurement system to evaluate performance and to drive continuous improvement. 
This measurement system, which is not based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), is intended to 
motivate desired behavior of employees and drive performance. It is not intended to measure a division's 
contribution to enterprise results. The sales and cost information used for internal purposes varies significantly from 
our consolidated, externally-reported information resulting in substantial reconciling items. Each division has 
specific performance targets and is evaluated and compensated based on achieving those targets. Performance 
targets differ from division to division; therefore, meaningful comparisons cannot be made among the profit or 
service center divisions. It is the comparison of actual results to budgeted results that makes our internal reporting 
valuable to management. Consequently, we feel that the financial information required by Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) "Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information" 
has limited value for our external readers. 
 
Due to Caterpillar's high level of integration and our concern that segment disclosures based on SFAS 131 
requirements have limited value to external readers, we are continuing to disclose GAAP-based financial results for 
our three lines of business (Machinery, Engines, and Financial Products) in our Management's Discussion and 
Analysis beginning on page A-21. 
 
Segment measurement and reconciliations 
 
Please refer to Table V on Pages A-18 and A-19 for financial information regarding our segments. There are several 
accounting differences between our segment reporting and our GAAP-based external reporting. Our segments are 
measured on an accountable basis; therefore, only those items for which divisional management is directly 
responsible are included in the determination of segment profit/loss and assets. The following is a list of the more 
significant accounting differences: 
 
.   Generally, liabilities are managed at the corporate level and are not included in segment operations. Segment 
accountable assets generally include inventories, receivables, property, plant, and equipment. 
 
.   We account for intersegment transfers using a system of market-based prices. With minor exceptions, each of the 
profit centers either sells or purchases virtually all of its products to or from other profit centers within the company. 
Our high level of integration results in our internally reported sales being approximately doubles that of our 
consolidated, externally-reported sales. 
 
 Segment inventories and cost of sales are valued using a current cost methodology. 
 Timing differences occur between our internal reporting and our external reporting such as: postretirement 
benefit expenses and profit that is recognized on intersegment transfers. 
 Interest expense is imputed (i.e., charged) to profit centers based on their level of accountable assets. This 
calculation takes into consideration the corporate debt to debt plus equity ratio and a weighted-average 
corporate interest rate. 
 In general, foreign currency fluctuations are neutralized for segment reporting. 
 Accountable profit is determined on a pre-tax basis. 
 
Reconciling items are created based on accounting differences between segment reporting and our consolidated, 
external reporting. Please refer to Table V on Pages A-18 and A-19 for financial information regarding significant 
reconciling items. Most of our reconciling items are self-explanatory given the above explanations of accounting 
differences. However, for the reconciliation of profit, we have grouped the reconciling items as follows: 
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.   Corporate costs:  Certain corporate costs are not charged to our segments. These costs are related to corporate 
requirements and strategies that are considered to be for the benefit of the entire organization. 
 
.   Methodology differences:  See previous discussion of significant accounting differences between segment 
reporting and consolidated, external reporting. 
 
.   Methodology changes in segment reporting:  Estimated restatements of prior periods to reflect changes in our 
internal-reporting methodology. 
 
